In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
capacity for morality.
So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
So, it must be the case that for an action A:
1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
could do so.
Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
immoral action.
Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
real morality, for two reasons:
1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
rational standard.
It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
this model.
I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
> In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> capacity for morality.
> So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> could do so.
What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
you ever done it?
> Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> immoral action.
> Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> real morality, for two reasons:
> 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> rational standard.
> It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> this model.
> I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
> On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > capacity for morality.
> > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > could do so.
> What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> you ever done it?
Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
emotional reactions.
So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
capacity.
I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
fact, here's an example:
A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
So, going down the list:
Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
even worse.
Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
the decisions.
Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
against my instincts.
My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
it. Why should I do anything?")
About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> > wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> > do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> > immoral action.
> > Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> > real morality, for two reasons:
> > 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> > immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> > 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> > Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> > problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> > with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> > is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> > empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> > rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> > doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> > reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> > is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> > instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> > if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> > that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> > responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> > rational standard.
> > It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> > mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> > Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> > morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> > morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> > case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> > given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> > for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> > this model.
> > I invite arguments against this model or for other models.- Hide quoted text -
> On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > capacity for morality.
> > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > could do so.
> > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > you ever done it?
> Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> emotional reactions.
> So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> capacity.
> I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> fact, here's an example:
> A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> So, going down the list:
> Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> even worse.
> Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> the decisions.
> Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> against my instincts.
> My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> it. Why should I do anything?")
> About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> > > wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> > > do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> > > immoral action.
> > > Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> > > real morality, for two reasons:
> > > 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> > > immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> > > 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> > > Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> > > problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> > > with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> > > is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> > > empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> > > rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> > > doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> > > reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> > > is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> > > instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> > > if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> > > that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> > > responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> > > rational standard.
> > > It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> > > mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> > > Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> > > morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> > > morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> > > case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> > > given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> > > for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> > > this model.
> > > I invite arguments against this model or for other models.- Hide quoted
> text -
> > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
> > - Show quoted text -
> --
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> On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > capacity for morality.
> > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > could do so.
> > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > you ever done it?
> Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> emotional reactions.
> So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> capacity.
> I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> fact, here's an example:
> A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> So, going down the list:
> Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> even worse.
> Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> the decisions.
> Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> against my instincts.
> My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> it. Why should I do anything?")
> About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> So, yeah, looks like I do.
I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
option?
I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
an example where it would apply?
> On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > could do so.
> > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > you ever done it?
> > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > emotional reactions.
> > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > capacity.
> > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > fact, here's an example:
> > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > So, going down the list:
> > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > even worse.
> > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > the decisions.
> > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > against my instincts.
> > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> option?
Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> an example where it would apply?
Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
do?
There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
say two people were vying for the same job and one saw the other
cheating. the one that cheated got the job and the other knew it was
because he cheated. tossing his morals aside, he reasoned that if he
iced the other guy, he would then get the job. since he has thrown out
guilt as a part of his moral code, there would be no emotional
reprocussions. reason without morals can be a very dangerous animal.
On Nov 7, 5:49 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > could do so.
> > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > you ever done it?
> > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > emotional reactions.
> > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > capacity.
> > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > fact, here's an example:
> > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > So, going down the list:
> > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > even worse.
> > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > the decisions.
> > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > against my instincts.
> > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > option?
> Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > an example where it would apply?
> Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> do?
> There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...- Hide quoted text -
> In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> capacity for morality.
> So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
I see this as some sort of "begging the question" fallacy.
I mean, 2) is about guilt, and guilt presupposes some sort of morality
at play, otherwise one would not feel guilt, would they?
__________________________________________
Science means simply the aggregate of all the recipes that are always
successful. All the rest is literature.
-- Paul Valéry
> On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > could do so.
> > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > you ever done it?
> > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > emotional reactions.
> > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > capacity.
> > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > fact, here's an example:
> > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > So, going down the list:
> > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > even worse.
> > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > the decisions.
> > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > against my instincts.
> > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > option?
> Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > an example where it would apply?
> Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> do?
> There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
On Nov 7, 7:29 am, showmethehoney <alenasha...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> say two people were vying for the same job and one saw the other
> cheating. the one that cheated got the job and the other knew it was
> because he cheated. tossing his morals aside, he reasoned that if he
> iced the other guy, he would then get the job. since he has thrown out
> guilt as a part of his moral code, there would be no emotional
> reprocussions. reason without morals can be a very dangerous animal.
Good thing what I'm actually advocating for are rational morals, and
not morals based on guilty feelings that may not indicate the right
thing to do.
> On Nov 7, 5:49 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > capacity.
> > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > even worse.
> > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > the decisions.
> > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > against my instincts.
> > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > option?
> > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > an example where it would apply?
> > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > do?
> > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...- Hide quoted text -
> On Nov 6, 6:31 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > capacity for morality.
> > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> I see this as some sort of "begging the question" fallacy.
> I mean, 2) is about guilt, and guilt presupposes some sort of morality
> at play, otherwise one would not feel guilt, would they?
Guilt doesn't have to relate to a moral judgment of right or wrong.
You will feel guilty about, say, not getting your child the gift they
really want for Christmas even though there's no actual moral
principle telling you that.
> __________________________________________
> Science means simply the aggregate of all the recipes that are always
> successful. All the rest is literature.
> -- Paul Valéry
> On Nov 7, 9:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > capacity.
> > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > even worse.
> > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > the decisions.
> > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > against my instincts.
> > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > option?
> > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > an example where it would apply?
> > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > do?
> > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
> Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
> guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
> me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
> example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
It might be.
It also might be because your moral code calls for fair treatment for
all, and you know that his cheating breaks that.
> On Nov 7, 3:42 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 7, 9:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > > capacity.
> > > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > > even worse.
> > > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > > the decisions.
> > > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > > against my instincts.
> > > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > > option?
> > > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > > an example where it would apply?
> > > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > > do?
> > > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
> > Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
> > guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
> > me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
> > example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
> It might be.
> It also might be because your moral code calls for fair treatment for
> all, and you know that his cheating breaks that.
> Or any number of other reasons.
In order for (2) to apply, am I supposed to imagine that I would feel
*more guilty* for doing B than for doing A, even though I believe that
B is morally permissible and A is not?
You haven't given us an actual *example* of someone choosing to do B
even though all of (1)-(5) apply. It would be nice if we could look at
an actual example of someone making a decision like this.
> > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > capacity for morality.
> > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > I see this as some sort of "begging the question" fallacy.
> > I mean, 2) is about guilt, and guilt presupposes some sort of morality
> > at play, otherwise one would not feel guilt, would they?
> Guilt doesn't have to relate to a moral judgment of right or wrong.
> You will feel guilty about, say, not getting your child the gift they
> really want for Christmas even though there's no actual moral
> principle telling you that.
However, morality is not always strictly about right/wrong, it is
often about choices... about the lesser of two evils, etc.
By the way, do animals feel guilt?
__________________________________________
Science means simply the aggregate of all the recipes that are always
successful. All the rest is literature.
-- Paul Valéry
> On Nov 8, 9:32 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 7, 3:42 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 7, 9:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > > > capacity.
> > > > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > > > even worse.
> > > > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > > > the decisions.
> > > > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > > > against my instincts.
> > > > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > > > option?
> > > > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > > > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > > > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > > > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > > > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > > > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > > > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > > > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > > > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > > > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > > > an example where it would apply?
> > > > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > > > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > > > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > > > do?
> > > > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
> > > Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
> > > guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
> > > me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
> > > example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
> > It might be.
> > It also might be because your moral code calls for fair treatment for
> > all, and you know that his cheating breaks that.
> > Or any number of other reasons.
> In order for (2) to apply, am I supposed to imagine that I would feel
> *more guilty* for doing B than for doing A, even though I believe that
> B is morally permissible and A is not?
That would be the case. For example, you might not feel guilty at all
if you didn't do B.
> You haven't given us an actual *example* of someone choosing to do B
> even though all of (1)-(5) apply. It would be nice if we could look at
> an actual example of someone making a decision like this.
While nice, it isn't required, since we know we have the capacity to
take actions that we would feel guilty about doing, and that's all I'm
saying we have to have.
> On Nov 7, 5:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > I see this as some sort of "begging the question" fallacy.
> > > I mean, 2) is about guilt, and guilt presupposes some sort of morality
> > > at play, otherwise one would not feel guilt, would they?
> > Guilt doesn't have to relate to a moral judgment of right or wrong.
> > You will feel guilty about, say, not getting your child the gift they
> > really want for Christmas even though there's no actual moral
> > principle telling you that.
> However, morality is not always strictly about right/wrong, it is
> often about choices... about the lesser of two evils, etc.
If morality says that you should choose the lesser of two evils, then
choosing that lesser evil is right, even if it is an evil.
> By the way, do animals feel guilt?
I'm not sure. I don't find it particularly relevant, though.
> On Nov 7, 7:14 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 8, 9:32 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > On Nov 7, 3:42 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 7, 9:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > > > > capacity.
> > > > > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > > > > even worse.
> > > > > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > > > > the decisions.
> > > > > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > > > > against my instincts.
> > > > > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > > > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > > > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > > > > option?
> > > > > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > > > > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > > > > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > > > > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > > > > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > > > > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > > > > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > > > > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > > > > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > > > > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > > > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > > > > an example where it would apply?
> > > > > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > > > > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > > > > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > > > > do?
> > > > > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
> > > > Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
> > > > guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
> > > > me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
> > > > example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
> > > It might be.
> > > It also might be because your moral code calls for fair treatment for
> > > all, and you know that his cheating breaks that.
> > > Or any number of other reasons.
> > In order for (2) to apply, am I supposed to imagine that I would feel
> > *more guilty* for doing B than for doing A, even though I believe that
> > B is morally permissible and A is not?
> That would be the case. For example, you might not feel guilty at all
> if you didn't do B.
Isn't that a bit hard to reconcile with believing that B is morally
permissible and A is not? Surely if I believe that A is not morally
permissible then I must experience some cognitive dissonance when I do
it.
> On Nov 8, 9:21 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 7, 7:14 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 8, 9:32 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > On Nov 7, 3:42 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Nov 7, 9:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > On Nov 6, 5:52 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:52 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Nov 6, 6:39 am, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > > > > > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > > > > > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > > > > > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > > > > > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > > > > > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > > > > > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > > > > > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > > > > > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > > > > > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > > > > > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > > > > > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > > > > > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > > > > > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > > > > > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > > > > > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > > > > > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > > > > > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > > > > > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > > > > > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > > > > > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > > > > > > > could do so.
> > > > > > > > > What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> > > > > > > > > you ever done it?
> > > > > > > > Well, it is certainly the case that we can do B in all of these
> > > > > > > > cases. I can do something else even if I really want to do something,
> > > > > > > > for example people who really want to eat something but don't because
> > > > > > > > they want to stay on their diet. Humans definitively have second
> > > > > > > > order desires. We can certainly do things that we will and know we
> > > > > > > > will feel guilty about doing. There is good evidence that we can do
> > > > > > > > things that don't objectively benefit us the most, as per almost any
> > > > > > > > good hearted donations to charity. We can stop ourselves from doing
> > > > > > > > instinctive things. We can stop ourselves from following our
> > > > > > > > emotional reactions.
> > > > > > > > So, about the only thing missing is doing this because we think it
> > > > > > > > immoral. Not only does that seem like a safe argument -- since we
> > > > > > > > know that people can do things on principle -- but it would also be
> > > > > > > > about practice, not capacity ... and the discussion here is about
> > > > > > > > capacity.
> > > > > > > > I do, in fact, do things on the basis of principle consistently. In
> > > > > > > > fact, here's an example:
> > > > > > > > A while ago, I bought a new vehicle, and sold my old one to my
> > > > > > > > parents. So I drove it down to them and took the bus back. The bus
> > > > > > > > has a rule that people who need assistance are to board first, which I
> > > > > > > > agreed with. When the bus arrived, there was a rush to line-up to get
> > > > > > > > onto the bus first. There was a veteran in line with an oxygen tank,
> > > > > > > > who ended up behind me in the line. After several attempts, I drew
> > > > > > > > the attention of the bus attendent to that, and the veteran moved
> > > > > > > > ahead in the line (although some others had already boarded).
> > > > > > > > So, going down the list:
> > > > > > > > Doing that was not what I most wanted to do, and in fact I really,
> > > > > > > > really didn't want to do that since I didn't want to have to say
> > > > > > > > anything or interrupt, and that it took several tries only made that
> > > > > > > > even worse.
> > > > > > > > Doing that didn't benefit me at all; I got nothing out of it and, in
> > > > > > > > fact, it meant that I would have to wait in line longer. While the
> > > > > > > > difference was minor, it was there and I recognized that when making
> > > > > > > > the decisions.
> > > > > > > > Instinctively, I don't speak up for such things, ever, so that was
> > > > > > > > against my instincts.
> > > > > > > > My emotional reactions biased me against speaking up, especially as it
> > > > > > > > required more attempts (frustration leads to a decision of "Oh, forget
> > > > > > > > it. Why should I do anything?")
> > > > > > > > About the only thing missing was that I wouldn't have felt guilty
> > > > > > > > either way, really ... or, at least, not for very long. Not long
> > > > > > > > enough for that to factor in my decision, at any rate, since I've not
> > > > > > > > done things that I've felt more guilty about in the past.
> > > > > > > > So, yeah, looks like I do.
> > > > > > > I think it was (2) that bothered me more than anything. Why would you
> > > > > > > feel guilty for doing B when you believe that it is the more moral
> > > > > > > option?
> > > > > > Because, for example, your initial moral reasoning conditioned you to
> > > > > > be guilty for doing that, even if it was the right thing to do. Guilt
> > > > > > is, essentially, a conditioned emotional reaction based on the
> > > > > > morality we're taught as children. There's no guarantee that that
> > > > > > will actually reflect the right thing to do in any given situation.
> > > > > > This is the problem with any emotion or instinct based morality, like
> > > > > > the empathy model tossed out so casually here: you need a rational
> > > > > > evaluation to determine if it is right or incorrect, at which point
> > > > > > you might as well just use reason. Let over guilt biases you away
> > > > > > from the rationally correct thing to do when they disagree.
> > > > > > > I'm just not clear why you included (2) in the list; can you give me
> > > > > > > an example where it would apply?
> > > > > > Imagine that you catch your friend cheating on a test. Imagine that
> > > > > > you are morally obligated to report that cheating. Wouldn't you still
> > > > > > feel guilty about it, even though it was the morally correct thing to
> > > > > > do?
> > > > > > There are numerous examples of this that can be raised ...
> > > > > Sure, examples like that can come up, and presumably the sense of
> > > > > guilt comes from "conflicting loyalties". But maybe you can explain to
> > > > > me why I am morally obliged to report my friend's cheating in your
> > > > > example. Is it because I have signed some sort of contract?
> > > > It might be.
> > > > It also might be because your moral code calls for fair treatment for
> > > > all, and you know that his cheating breaks that.
> > > > Or any number of other reasons.
> > > In order for (2) to apply, am I supposed to imagine that I would feel
> > > *more guilty* for doing B than for doing A, even though I believe that
> > > B is morally permissible and A is not?
> > That would be the case. For example, you might not feel guilty at all
> > if you didn't do B.
> Isn't that a bit hard to reconcile with believing that B is morally
> permissible and A is not? Surely if I believe that A is not morally
> permissible then I must experience some cognitive dissonance when I do
> it.
First, cognitive dissonance and guilt are not the same thing.
Second, in order for there to be a difficulty here, it has to be the
case that one believes that the emotional response -- guilt -- and the
rational evaluation of what is or isn't moral are always aligned.
They aren't. In fact, the main reason for 2) is to make it clear that
if one has a rational standard one can follow it even if the immediate
emotional response biases the actor against that action.
> In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> capacity for morality.
> So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> could do so.
> Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> immoral action.
> Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> real morality, for two reasons:
> 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
klytu: Interesting post! I think this is an excellent model for what
constitutes moral capacity, and at first glance I don't think you've
left anything important out of it. I do question your assertions,
though. How do you know that 1) and 2) holds for animals? Or that 1)
and 2) don't hold for even the majority of humans?
> Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> rational standard.
> It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> this model.
> I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
> On Nov 6, 6:31 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > capacity for morality.
> > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > could do so.
> > Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> > wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> > do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> > immoral action.
> > Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> > real morality, for two reasons:
> > 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> > immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> > 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> klytu: Interesting post! I think this is an excellent model for what
> constitutes moral capacity, and at first glance I don't think you've
> left anything important out of it. I do question your assertions,
> though. How do you know that 1) and 2) holds for animals?
The evidence we have on animals is that they are not capable of
sufficient abstract reasoning to even grasp the idea of what a moral
would actually be, let alone that one should guide their actions based
on it, and there is no evidence that they are capable of knowing that
they shouldn't want something.
> Or that 1)
> and 2) don't hold for even the majority of humans?
The majority of adult humans can understand what a moral is and decide
to act on it instead of general desires, whether or not they do so.
They also generally have second order desires.
> > Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> > problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> > with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> > is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> > empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> > rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> > doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> > reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> > is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> > instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> > if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> > that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> > responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> > rational standard.
> > It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> > mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> > Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> > morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> > morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> > case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> > given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> > for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> > this model.
> > I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
> On Nov 8, 4:25 pm, klytu <jazzyjef...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > On Nov 6, 6:31 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > capacity for morality.
> > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > could do so.
> > > Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> > > wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> > > do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> > > immoral action.
> > > Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> > > real morality, for two reasons:
> > > 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> > > immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> > > 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> > klytu: Interesting post! I think this is an excellent model for what
> > constitutes moral capacity, and at first glance I don't think you've
> > left anything important out of it. I do question your assertions,
> > though. How do you know that 1) and 2) holds for animals?
> The evidence we have on animals is that they are not capable of
> sufficient abstract reasoning to even grasp the idea of what a moral
> would actually be, let alone that one should guide their actions based
> on it, and there is no evidence that they are capable of knowing that
> they shouldn't want something.
> > Or that 1)
> > and 2) don't hold for even the majority of humans?
> The majority of adult humans can understand what a moral is and decide
> to act on it instead of general desires, whether or not they do so.
> They also generally have second order desires.
klytu: It seems to me that for us to know whether or not these
assertions are true, we would have to have access to the inner
thoughts and consciousness. We have data on behavior, but I am not
aware of any access to inner thoughts other than one's own. Granted we
can communicate with other people and infer that second order desires
exist and that people can understand what a moral is and act on it
despite contradicting general desires. I don't really want to quibble
about this much, because I think I understand where you are coming
from and your ideas are intriguing. But I just wanted to point out
that *reasons* for particular behaviors are complex and that it's
possible that people don't act they way they do for even the reasons
they themselves think they do. If this is the case, then your model
may be correct but practically it may not be testable.
> > > Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> > > problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> > > with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> > > is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> > > empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> > > rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> > > doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> > > reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> > > is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> > > instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> > > if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> > > that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> > > responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> > > rational standard.
> > > It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> > > mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> > > Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> > > morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> > > morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> > > case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> > > given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> > > for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> > > this model.
> > > I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
> On Nov 8, 4:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > On Nov 8, 4:25 pm, klytu <jazzyjef...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Nov 6, 6:31 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > > In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> > > > things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> > > > answers have been stabbed at. So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> > > > about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> > > > morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> > > > are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> > > > capacity for morality.
> > > > So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> > > > In order for something to be said to be capable of morality, it must
> > > > be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> > > > it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> > > > in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
> > > > So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> > > > 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> > > > 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> > > > 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> > > > 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> > > > 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
> > > > And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> > > > morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> > > > Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> > > > could do so.
> > > > Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> > > > wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
> > > > do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> > > > immoral action.
> > > > Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> > > > real morality, for two reasons:
> > > > 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> > > > immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
> > > > 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
> > > klytu: Interesting post! I think this is an excellent model for what
> > > constitutes moral capacity, and at first glance I don't think you've
> > > left anything important out of it. I do question your assertions,
> > > though. How do you know that 1) and 2) holds for animals?
> > The evidence we have on animals is that they are not capable of
> > sufficient abstract reasoning to even grasp the idea of what a moral
> > would actually be, let alone that one should guide their actions based
> > on it, and there is no evidence that they are capable of knowing that
> > they shouldn't want something.
> > > Or that 1)
> > > and 2) don't hold for even the majority of humans?
> > The majority of adult humans can understand what a moral is and decide
> > to act on it instead of general desires, whether or not they do so.
> > They also generally have second order desires.
> klytu: It seems to me that for us to know whether or not these
> assertions are true, we would have to have access to the inner
> thoughts and consciousness. We have data on behavior, but I am not
> aware of any access to inner thoughts other than one's own.
However, in this case you can determine this on the basis of
behaviour, by setting up conditions where having second order desires
would change actions. And animals don't do that. Also, they have
never been able to demonstrate that they are aware of what a moral
would be, or even that level of abstraction from their behaviour. So
we have a pretty good idea without needing to know internal thoughts.
> can communicate with other people and infer that second order desires
> exist and that people can understand what a moral is and act on it
> despite contradicting general desires. I don't really want to quibble
> about this much, because I think I understand where you are coming
> from and your ideas are intriguing. But I just wanted to point out
> that *reasons* for particular behaviors are complex and that it's
> possible that people don't act they way they do for even the reasons
> they themselves think they do. If this is the case, then your model
> may be correct but practically it may not be testable.
> > > > Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> > > > problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> > > > with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> > > > is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
> > > > empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> > > > rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> > > > doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> > > > reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
> > > > is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
> > > > instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
> > > > if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
> > > > that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
> > > > responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
> > > > rational standard.
> > > > It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
> > > > mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
> > > > Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
> > > > morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
> > > > morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
> > > > case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
> > > > given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
> > > > for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
> > > > this model.
> > > > I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
On Nov 6, 3:31 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> In various threads -- including a new one from TG -- at what point
> things are capable of being moral has been discussed, and various
> answers have been stabbed at.
Capable of being moral ?
Ha ha ha ha ha
Morality or the lack thereof is simply a judgment made as to the
efficacy of an act as is thought to have been committed by the one
who's judgment is being exercised.
No such as objective morality exists or ever could the closest we get
at present is a consensus of opinion relating thereto at which time
and in which case the behavior becomes an idealization of good
behavior . When
the evaluation of behaviors and consequences thereof as are being
studied in the scientific fields neurology ,sociology, psychiatry,
physiology, anthropology and yes evolution have congealed into a
cohesive hole we will come as close as is possible to selecting our
best behavioral concepts with sound scientific insight. The results of
pure scientific method shall have afforded us enough data from which
to select therefrom a form of ethics sufficient to guide the
structuring of our civil laws and to use for instruction for the slow
thinking and uneducated among us with profoundly effective results.
So, I'd like a thread talking simply
> about what conditions must be true for something to be capable of
> morality, and why I don't think that some of the things that people
> are claiming have "limited capacity for morality" actually have ANY
> capacity for morality.
Observer
Such depends entirely of the discovery , through the application of
scientific method ,in those disciplines created for that purpose
uncover to be the most utilitarian and what of the the body politic
is willing to select an being in alliance with the goals thereof.
> So, here's my definition, which we can argue over:
> In order for something to be said to be capable of morality,
Observer
“ capable of morality” how does an opinion or even a consensus become
capable of being moral when morality its self is just that. (an
opinion)?
The only guide humanity has for its behavior is its individual plus
the consensus of opinions, relating to what is most reasonable
according the the collective and individual fictions by which we
internally conjecture what must be correct and in accordance there
with.
In order to change the behavioral patterns one must alter the
fictions by which the individual and the the controlling factions of
society live . That is to say the*philosophies of as if *chosen
generally, by a lack rational thought having been applied to sound
scientific data. The answer to which is intensive investigation in the
scientific fields related thereto and the universality of education
which contains the art of critical thought , the broadest possible
collection scientific data and a thorough instruction in the wonder
of scientific method.
it must
> be the case that they are capable of taking an action simply because
> it is the morally correct action, even if taking that contradiction is
> in conflict with every other mechanism they use to make a decision.
Observer
Bull shit ! Human action must be based on a sound education of the
product of scientific method as applied to neurology, psychology,
physiology, and the entire spectrum of disciplines which support the
work of sociology not to exclude political science.
> So, it must be the case that for an action A:
> 1) They really want to do A, more than any other option.
> 2) They would feel guilty if they didn't do A.
> 3) Doing A benefits them the most out of all the available options.
> 4) Their instincts are telling them to do A.
> 5) Their emotional reactions are biasing them towards doing A.
Observer
What crap ! One of the prime human desires is to be a successful
functioning member of some power within their social group.
Think about it as it is a powerful concept an provides information as
to the reasons that people do some very laudable and some extremely
contemptible acts.
> And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
> morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
> Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
> could do so.
Observer
Utilitarian behavior must be understood for the correctness thereof in
accordance with an educated persons understanding of the value of
science. (organized knowledge)
Optimal decision
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
An optimal decision is a decision such that no other available
decision options will lead to a better outcome. It is an important
concept in decision theory. In order to compare the different decision
outcomes, one commonly assigns a relative utility to each of them.
It is all fairly simple and can be studied as a scientific field to
which can be applied scientific method.
> Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
> wants about what you should want.
Observer
I have no idea what wants about wants means in the real world sounds
to me like schizoid symptoms.
The rational mind has no need to be tossed and turned by the stupidity
of a moral structure which is confrontational to either his/her
physiology or his/her psychological structure unless that person is
mentally or physically deformed or tormented by belief in the filth of
religion/superstition, (the crap contained in the belief in
fetishistic magic and psychotic filth of Christianity or other such
utter psychotic nonsense/ madness) .
So, even though the person wants to
> do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
> immoral action.
Observer
You live the fictions of a person who has no basis for making
decisions other than systems of thought taught you by christian
superstitious nonsense (the belief in fetishistic magic and the
desires of a sadomasochist), and the pie in the sky poetics of
nonsense offered by those who can use language to represent the
nonexistent as though it were real.
Such ideas as spouted by persons who can not tell the difference
between reasoning from a sound premise and reasoning from a primes
because it presents few difficulties in the process there of.
I give you the profound philosophies of the east to which western
philosophies pale by comparison, and invite you to investigate their
premises using scientific method . Examine,for example ,the glorious
reasoning applied to the premise of the monad and then search
scientifically for the monad or any real evidence thereof. The result
is beauty and the beast as relates to the beauty of the reasoning
applied to the premise and the beast of having started such from a
concept which is soothes the logical mind but is completely without
actuality or fact as defined by science.
The fact that thoughts flow freely from a primes in no way assures
that that premise is of any scientific value. The best of logic fails
to yield any truth ( dependably useful information ) when applied to
a faulty premise.
> Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
> real morality, for two reasons:
Observer
The emerging fields of evolutionary biology and in particular
sociobiology have demonstrated that, though human social behaviors are
complex, the precursors of human morality can be traced to the
behaviors of many other social animals.
According to Shermer, the following characteristics are shared by
humans and other social animals, particularly the great apes:
attachment and bonding, cooperation and mutual aid, sympathy and
empathy, direct and indirect reciprocity, altruism and reciprocal
altruism, conflict resolution and peacemaking, deception and deception
detection, community concern and caring about what others think about
you, and awareness of and response to the social rules of the group.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_morality#Primate_sociality
> 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
> immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
Observer
Animals do behave with regard to the pleasure and well being of other
animals you disqualify this from moral behavior ? Based on what
exactly.
> 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
Observer
What nonsense this “second order of desires . It is simply the
conflict left in their minds by a lack of a useful education.
One has natural desires which are in conflict with some code of
conduct which has been fed them and which has not been resolved by the
application of critical thought as relates to the desire and the code
which is critical thereof.
> Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
> problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
> with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
> is leading to a morally correct choice.
Observer
You once again confound your self with words which have very little
meaning in the study of ethics.
Learn to reason just how ethics and morality naturally evolves from
self interest. If you can not then you have problems which are far
more deep and disturbing than I wish to deal with, in which case I
would strongly recommend a psychiatric evaluation.
Under this idea, the
> empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
> rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
> doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
> reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral,
Observer
Nor does it make them immoral . At present , however the question is
moot in that there exists no objective morality
...
> On Nov 6, 10:31 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>> And yet they can still choose to do B simply because either B is the
>> morally correct thing to do, or A is an immoral action to take.
>> Nothing in this says that they must do B, but simply says that they
>> could do so.
> What evidence do you have that humans are capable of doing this? Have
> you ever done it?
A man's wife cheats on him. He really wants to kill himself, he feels that is the right thing to do and will solve the problem of his pain.
Instead he chooses to kill his wife.
Can't be specific because it was years ago, I believe here in Toronto. Came out in court.
>> Part of this can be in reference to second order desires, which are
>> wants about what you should want. So, even though the person wants to
>> do A, they don't want to want to do A because they know that A is an
>> immoral action.
>> Thus, I claim that no animal -- other than humans -- is capable of
>> real morality, for two reasons:
>> 1) They are incapable of understanding that an action is or isn't
>> immoral independent of their reactions, which includes empathy.
>> 2) They are incapable of having second order desires.
>> Note that, if this is correct, basing morality on empathy has a big
>> problem since it is simply basing your actions on emotional reactions,
>> with no real identification of whether or not that empathetic reaction
>> is leading to a morally correct choice. Under this idea, the
>> empathetic reaction must be guided and trained directly by the
>> rational moral code, meaning that the inherent physiology argument
>> doesn't relate to the action being moral; that we have instinctive
>> reactions that lead to specific actions does not make them moral, and
>> is not truly an indication of our moral capacity (since simple
>> instinctive reactions aren't the hallmark of moral capacity). Thus,
>> if a rational and empathetic morality is desired, it must be the case
>> that the rational morality be developed FIRST, and then the empathetic
>> responses justified by, evaluated against, and trained by that
>> rational standard.
>> It also means that if you show that something has empathy it doesn't
>> mean that they are moral or are even capable of morality.
>> Also, this causes issues for their not being a "saltation point" of
>> morality. One argument against that is that we see degrees of
>> morality, amongst other animals and primates. This is clearly not the
>> case, if this idea of moral capacity is correct; no other animal has
>> given any indication of having any capacity for morality, and capacity
>> for morality really does seem like an "all-or-nothing" capacity under
>> this model.
>> I invite arguments against this model or for other models.
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-- "In my life, I have prayed but one prayer: Oh Lord, make my enemies ridiculous. And God granted it."
[Voltaire]
"Rational Standard" is a nice term. It leaves no scope for a response
based on organic instinct .
So again the same question crops up ---- Who gets to decide whether
action B is morally correct thing to do or not ? There is no basis for
the assumption that moralist model is the ultimate "Rational
Standard". What looks like morally correct action from moralist point
of view, may look like plain stupidity from liberal point of view.
On Nov 8, 9:27 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> First, cognitive dissonance and guilt are not the same thing.
> Second, in order for there to be a difficulty here, it has to be the
> case that one believes that the emotional response -- guilt -- and the
> rational evaluation of what is or isn't moral are always aligned.
> They aren't. In fact, the main reason for 2) is to make it clear that
> if one has a rational standard one can follow it even if the immediate
> emotional response biases the actor against that action.- Hide quoted text -
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